Karl Marx’s Critique of Capitalism From the Vantage Point of Freedom

“The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and extent. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces.”

Karl Marx[i]

Before attempting to dissect Karl Marx’s writings - with the hope of attaining a comprehension of his ideals and concluding a particular theme in which his works are to be categorised – one has to acknowledge the fact that Marx’s works are multi-dimensional analyses based on capitalist relations of production and the accompanying social relations in general.[ii] To read Marx is to ask the following questions: does Marx regard the capitalist mode of production to be unjust? If so, does Marx demonstrate a clearly defined morality in his critique of capitalism? Furthermore, does this mean that Marx had in mind a particular futuristic projection of what a developed individual in a communist society would look like? The answers to those questions lie initially in Marx’s own rejection of traditionalist morality and his critique of capitalism as the dialectic of freedom.

Indeed, Marx did envision a possible emergence of human authenticity in a post-capitalist environment, and his conception of post-capitalist society introduced a realm of freedom beyond the production processes per se; in doing this, however, he intentionally avoided the utilisation of a theory of morality in order to distance himself from those who contested the validity of his works from a moral perspective. Marx, instead, positioned his critique of capitalist exploitation of the proletariat as central to his writings, after he was fully immersed in the critique of political economy and his development of the theory of surplus value.[iii] Throughout his analytical approach of political economy, he emphasised that the suppression of the human capacity to engage in communal relations of production is what generates alienation; alienation as the symptom of the deficiency of freedom. Alienation is not exclusive to the proletariat, but is common to both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; however it is only the proletariat that experiences the annihilation and powerlessness which capitalism entails.[iv] While the bourgeoisie “finds in this self-alienation its confirmation and its good, its own power: it has a semblance of human existence,” [v] the proletariat, as the class that is burdened by work, becomes more engaged with production and commodity, until becoming a commodity itself, and hence in a constant state of enslavement.[vi] 

The inhuman existence of the alienated proletariat corresponds to Marx’s description of the “political animal world” of civil society, implying that the human capacity for democratic relationships has been suppressed. Marx exemplifies this point by emphasising the failure of the political economy to legitimise its methods and ends on anything other than “the interests of the capitalists.”[vii] From here, Marx commences to clarify the notion of alienation of labour. However, before one reads Estranged Labour, one has to examine Marx’s underlining of human potential for democratic relationships. Marx discusses social relationships in communal production, in a manner that demonstrates the transformation of his democratic vision into a more theoretical perspective: the objectification of the producer’s individuality in his product; the producer’s gratification from knowing that the product has satisfied the need of another; the sense of balance and harmony in social relationships that proceed on this basis; and the confirmation through this sense of the producer’s “human, communal nature.”[viii] In contrast to these points, when we read the definition of alienation in Estranged Labour we grasp the reality of the capitalist atmosphere of production as iterated by Marx: alienation from the product suppresses gratification from knowledge that the product satisfies a human need; alienation from the labour process suppresses the objectification of individuality in the product; alienation from fellow workers suppresses the sense of harmony and complementarity in social relations; and alienation from species-being suppresses the confirmation, through labour, of the worker’s communal nature.[ix] This alienation - that the worker experiences - demolishes the transcendence of egoistic individualism, and satisfies only the freedom of the worker’s animal functions, “while in his human functions he is nothing more than an animal.”[x] 

So far we have looked at alienation in our attempt to elucidate how Marx critiques capitalism. Marx’s criticism of capitalism is at least based on the value of freedom. The question of whether it is also founded on the value of justice will only be answered as a sequel to the question of freedom.

            It is important to realise that there are various dimensions to the freedom that Marx advocates. Firstly, one is truly free when free from fortuity and chance in the conditions of one’s life, and when able to participate in the control and direction of one’s affairs. Part of this aspect of freedom is an awareness and rational understanding of the nature of one’s life conditions, how they arose and how they operate. The result of this is “self-realisation and objectification of the subject, therefore real freedom, whose activity is precisely labour.”[xi] Obtaining control over the conditions of one’s life and subjecting them to a conscious, rational plan is not simply a development of one’s freedom, but also a development in one’s capacities and gifts.

            Secondly, freedom requires the objectification of man through his activities, products, and relations. This objectification, however, must take a particular form. That is, freedom obtains only in those interactions between people and things which take place in terms of their own concrete qualities.[xii] For Marx, freedom obtains when “everyone of your relations to men and to nature… [is] a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life.”[xiii] Therefore, one does not know, nor can one deal with, the “truth” of another being or thing – and hence freedom is not present – unless and until one’s relation to it is based on the specific, concrete qualities of both oneself and the “object”. Insofar as this does not happen man is lost in his object; his objects do not confirm and realise his individuality and alienation takes place.

Under capitalism and the environment of private property, people “carry on their work independently of each other… and do not come into social contact with each other until they exchange their products…”  Thus, “the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things.”[xiv]

Thirdly, freedom is something which can only be achieved in and through the community – in cooperation and association with others. Marx opposes not only the disregard of the interests of others to pursue one’s own interests, but also the division and separation of these interests in the first place. In a capitalist society based on private property we often encounter privacy as raised to an ultimate social principle. For Marx, however, freedom is realised through other people as well. “Personal freedoms becomes possible only within the community.”[xv] We must be careful with the notion of community here, since in this case it is much stronger than the utilitarian view of community in which the separate interests of individuals are made compatible by finding ends which maximally fulfill those interests. Rather, the usage here implies that a community exists to the extent that the separateness of individual interests is overcome in the self-conscious realisation by individuals that their lives as particular beings reflect a larger social and rational order.

Private property is inherently opposed to this form of community, and through its powers of disposing of the labour power of others it seeks to increase the product of their labour. That is to say that at the heart of bourgeois society lies the antithesis of private property to labour. Each has its own separate and opposed interests. One is in control while the other is under control. The capitalist propertied encourages the productivity of the propertyless worker. Increased production benefits the owner primarily – since the labour is his – while the labourer, on the contrary seeks to husband his labour, with any benefits of increased productivity return only secondary to him. He exercises little or no control over the directions and ends his labour is to follow. The development of such relations manifests itself not simply in the conflict between propertied and propertyless, but also in the separation of interests between personal and class individualities, particular and common interests, material labour and mental labour, town and country. Consequently, society is divided into diverse classes, each with its own interests to protect against the hostile and antagonistic interests of others. Accordingly, only an illusory freedom obtains in such a society. On the contrary, for Marx, people are only free in cooperative, harmonious relations with others in which rational and voluntary control is exercised over their life-activities.[xvi] It is this that capitalist private property fails to provide.[xvii] 

The notions of estrangement and alienation can be deemed associable with the slavery and exploitation. The latter terms, in turn, can be seen as indicative of a Marxian moralistic agenda that directly contributes to a critique on behalf of the idea of justice. Indeed, Marx’s analysis of the nature of capitalist private property identifies the source of the capitalist’s profit as the unpaid labour of the worker. However, Marx’s views on ideology preclude any such moral condemnation of capitalism – whether stated in terms of freedom or justice. The view that Marx has an absolute concept of justice can be thus maintained only by denying or avoiding Marx’s views on ideology. Marx speaks of the bourgeois limitations to the principle of equal right according to which the worker should receive back the undiminished proceeds of his labour.[xviii] Such a principle, in its inadequacy, ignores differences in need of each worker and assumes its distribution solely on the contribution of labour power by each worker. It is indeed a principle of inequality. Moreover, Marx insists that the validity of principles of distributive justice is linked to the particular modes of production out of which they arise. That is, the principles of justice appear to be relative to the particular modes of production. Hence, given the capitalist mode of production, one gets the system of bourgeois distributive justice.

As long as the capitalist tries to lengthen the working day beyond its normal limits can he be condemned as unjust. Capitalism depends on the meaningfulness of distinguishing between the values which each individual labourer adds to the value of the product. These proceeds of labour are then appropriated by the capitalist. In contrast to this, “within the cooperative society [that is communism] based on common ownership of the means of production, the producers do not exchange their products.” Hence “the phrase ‘proceeds of labour’… loses all meaning.”[xix] This implies that the notion of justice within the transactions of capitalist private property is emasculated, not in the sense that it is shown to be unjust, but in the more radical sense that it becomes useless and meaningless.

If we were to momentarily halt our endeavour to conclude a Marxian moral program, and focus on how Marx considers the principles of justice themselves, we find him emphasising their uselessness, not only within communism, but also under capitalism. The principles of justice cannot, by their nature, treat people with regard to their individual complexities, capacities, and needs. They are by their nature incapable of treating people concretely. “Unequal individuals… are measurable only by an equal standard in so far as they are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from one definite side only, for instance,… are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored.”[xx] Marx here is accentuating the fact that it is impossible to draw up a principle of justice that will take into account the inequalities of individuals. Let us now return to our analysis of a Marxian critique on behalf of justice, only to conclude that Marx’s views on justice seem to be relativistic, in the sense that, even though principles of justice are deemed useless in a social setting, they would be inapplicable to another social setting.

Marx, in a typical instance would state that “This kind of individual liberty [under capitalist private property] is thus at the same time the most complete suppression of all individual liberty and total subjugation of individuality to social conditions which take the form of material forces – and even of all-powerful objects that are independent of the individuals relating to them.”[xxi]  Here, he never claims that the individuals under the bourgeoisie are subjected to a complete suppression of justice, yet capitalism, as an exploitative system that is not geared to satisfy needs can be seen as unjust.[xxii] How then are we supposed to characterise Marx’s critique of capitalism? Does it possess a universal makeup, or can it be on behalf of both freedom and justice?

There is an underlying asymmetry between freedom and justice in Marx’s views. They are similar of course, but there exists a significant difference between them that has to do directly with their relation to the mode of production. Justice is tied closely with a particular mode of production that gives rise to and involves a particular principle of distribution. In the case of freedom, on the other hand, there is an intervening factor: the effect of the mode of production on the individuals and society in which it is found. The way in which people fulfill their needs and wants – by their mode of production - creates not only the means and mode of distribution of their livelihood but also the kind of people they are. It is the development of man, his capacities and abilities, through his productive forces and relations towards a conscious mastery which constitutes freedom. Freedom is the cultivation of one’s gifts in all directions.[xxiii] The centerpiece here is man’s self-determination, his ability and desire to control his own actions and affairs, unrestrained by external forces. Developed capitalistic private property renders such freedom impossible. It does this through fostering alienation and conflict of interest among the individuals of a society. There is, however no comparable basis for justice, because it concerns the ordering imposed on social goods, not the state of development of the means for producing those goods. But, again, a society is not more just because it possesses a greater developed mode of production. Freedom – not being an autonomous principle – should be appraised, not simply as an outgrowth of, but as an integral part of the development of the forces and relations of production upon which all societies are based. The basic criterion of freedom, for Marx, is the self-development of man and society through the development of the productive forces of society, rendering the Marxian freedom-oriented critique of capitalism one of positive connotations.

The self-realisation of the individual is the highest goal of Marxian socialism. The masses or the working class were to be the instrumentality of Marx’s envisioned revolutionary change, but it is the individual as such who is to be liberated in the post-revolutionary scheme of things. For Marx, it is the existence of classes which promote uniformity and suppresses individuality within each class. Therefore, the abolition of classes is not to be for the purpose of making all men uniform atoms in society, not to destroy variation, but to make the individual rather than the class the unit of variation.

[1] Karl Marx, “Estranged Labour” in Karl Marx Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p. 323.

[1] Paul Smart contends that “the search for a universal marxian ethic or a revolutionary principle of distributive justice within Marx’s works will always prove to be a fruitless and frustrating endeavour.” See Paul Smart, Mill and Marx (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 118. 

[1] Marx’s conception of alienation developed during his transition from the critique of Hegel to the critique of political economy.

[1] Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels, “The Holy Family” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 134. 

[1] Ibid.

[1] Karl Marx, “Estranged Labour”, p. 325.

[1] Ibid., p. 323.

[1] Karl Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s ‘Elements of Political Economy,’” in Karl Marx: Early Writings, ed. Quintin Hoare (New York: Vintage, 1975), p. 277-78.

[1] Karl Marx, “Estranged Labour”, p. 326-30.

[1] Ibid., p. 327.

[1] Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, ed. And trans. David McLellan (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 124.

[1] This excludes things of abstract, symbolic forms such as exchange-value and money.

[1] Karl Marx, “The Power of Money”, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3, (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 326.

[1] Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 73.

[1] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The German Ideology,” in Collected Works, Vol. 5, (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 47-8.

[1] Refer to Karl Marx, “Estranged Labour”, p. 328 for definition of conscious life activity.

[1] Karl Marx, “Estranged Labour”, p. 332.

[1] This is proposed in the Gotha program. Refer to Paul Smart, Mill and Marx, p. 127.

[1] Karl Marx, “Critque of the Gotha Program” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 386.

[1] Ibid., p. 387.

[1] Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, p. 131.

[1] Paul Smart, Mill and Marx, p. 124.

[1] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The German Ideology, p. 225.

Bibliography

Marx, Karl:

o       Capital, Volume 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967)

o       The Grundrisse, edited and translated by David McLellan (New York: Harper & Row, 1971)

o       “The Power of Money” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, Volume 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975)

o       “Estranged Labour” in Karl Marx Early Writings, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981)

o       “Excerpts from James Mill’s ‘Elements of Political Economy’” in Karl Marx: Early Writings, edited by Quintin Hoare (New York: Vintage, 1975)

o        “Critique of the Gotha Program” in The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972)

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich:

o       “The German Ideology” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, Volume 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976)

o        “The Holy Family” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, edited by David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977)

Smart, Paul:

o       Mill and Marx (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991)